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Abstract
This paper investigates the saving behavior of migrants in the UK across different
dimensions, i.e., comparing temporary versus permanent migrants and migrants versus
natives. Established theoretical predictions show that migrants save more when they
plan to stay in the destination only temporarily as target savers. Our empirical evidence
takes into account the contemporaneous choice of savings and remittances. Moreover,
when comparing the saving profiles of both natives and migrants, we uncover the
weight of observable socio-economic characteristics other than income and wealth.
We use the British Household Panel Survey for the period 1991-2008. The estimation
results confirm that temporary migrants have a propensity to save 26 per cent higher
than permanent migrants in UK. We also introduce an index of financial capability
adjusted for income as an explanatory variable and, when employing the
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition for the Tobit model of saving choice, migrants are more
affected by observable social-economic characteristics than natives.
JEL classification: F22; D91; C40
Keywords: Temporary migration; Savings; Remittances; Blinder-Oaxaca
decomposition
1 Introduction
The economic literature on migration investigates earnings and employment status as
good long-run indicators for the economic integration of migrants (Borjas 1995; Constant
and Zimmermann 2005; Peri 2012). Meanwhile, other authors (e.g., Bauer and Sinning
2011) argue that the level of private savings also plays an important role since a higher
propensity to save and invest financially in the destination country represents a strong
signal of social assimilation.
However, migrants are heterogeneous in terms of their expected length of stay – tem-
porary (or circular) versus permanent migrants – and their ability or willingness to save
may be different along this dimension.
The length of stay of migrants have relevant consequences on national savings when
temporary and permanent migrants have different attitudes to savings in the destination
country. Permanent migrants are expected to save and invest in the destination country as
a typical life-cycle decision, and their contributions will return to them when retiring in
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the same destination country. From the point of view of the inter-temporal computations,
permanent migrants and natives are not different, and the only leakage from the national
savings may be represented by the money sent to the origin country for reasons discussed
in the literature on remittances (see Rapoport and Docquier 2006). Temporary migrants
instead do not have any incentive to save and invest in the destination country; however,
they actually do, especially with compulsory payments to national pension systems, which
are difficult to withdraw or carry back to the origin country.1
Besides the effects on the domestic labor markets, the contribution to national savings,
foregone for migrants that decide to go back to the home country, is an additional reason
why governments in destination countries tend to prefer temporary versus permanent
migrants. For instance, countries like Germany or UK are moving toward a system that
regulates the stock of immigrants preferring short-term visas.
However, recent evidence shows that the decision to stay permanently in the destination
country may come with life experience, and many migrants that started with short-run
projects ended up spending their retirement in the receiving country. This is particularly
important in the next decades when the generations of migrants that arrived in richer
European countries during the 80s and 90s (or even before) will reach retirement age.
Germany, is an example of the importance of private savings for the future eco-
nomic situation of immigrants (see Bauer and Sinning 2011). In the 1960s and 1970s, a
large number of “temporary guest workers”, mainly from Southern Europe, migrated to
Germany. Most of them stayed in Germany permanently (Bauer and Zimmermann 2000).
The savings propensity and the resulting wealth position of this group of immigrants may
become an important factor for the German pension system because about 1.5 million
immigrants in Germany will reach retirement age within the next 15 years (Bauer and
Sinning 2011).
In this study, one objective is to uncover the difference in saving attitudes between tem-
porary and permanent migrants for the UK so as to test and quantify the gap and to
compare it with the natives.
In the migration literature, the length of stay has been considered an important deter-
minant of the saving behavior among migrants. For instance, Piore (1979) talks of
target-earning migrants as individuals saving money abroad with an investment goal in
their home country, like purchasing new dwellings. Temporary migrants may be associ-
ated with target earners whose primary motivation for going and working abroad is to
save enough money in order to start a small business at home or purchase either financial
or non-financial assets upon return (Djajic and Michael 2009).
Mesnard (2004) provides a model of the target-saving motive in an analysis of optimal
return decisions where temporary migrants are assumed to have borrowing constraints in
their country of origin. She concludes that once a migrant achieves the goal of accumulat-
ing a certain stock of assets abroad, she or he returns to the home country and invests. In
this perspective, the optimal migration duration coincides with the time needed to attain
the savings target.
Djajic and Milbourne (1988), Dustmann (1997, 2003), and Kirdar (2009) take a differ-
ent stand and emphasize the utility-maximizing approach to saving and return decisions,
where the optimal timing of return is determined by comparing the costs and benefits of
staying longer abroad. Yang (2006) highlights the differences between the target-earning
and life-cycle motivations of temporary migrants, emphasizing that if the aim is to attain
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a certain level of savings, the improved conditions in the origin country – such as an
increase in wages – should entail shorter overseas stays.
The economic literature refers mainly to three different types of saving behaviors for
migrants that are closely linked to the remitting choice.
Firstly, some authors emphasize that the length of stay may affect the level of remit-
tances, but not savings. Merkle and Zimmermann (1992) found that the planned duration
of the stay in the host country is a significant determinant of remittances, but they show
that there is no significant effect for savings. Dustmann and Mestres (2010) investigates
the saving plans and the assets holdings of migrants and shows that immigrants with tem-
porary return plans place a higher proportion of their savings in the home country as
remittances, with little effect on the national savings of the host economy. The magni-
tude and the share of assets accumulated at home (including the housing value) are larger
for the immigrants who consider migration as temporary. Notwithstanding this effect
on remittances, he finds no evidence that the temporary migrants save more than the
permanent ones.
Secondly, other contributions emphasize how savings are as important as remittances,
and, notwithstanding the direction, remittances (and the relative decision) may be consid-
ered as a form of savings. When sending money home, temporary migrants are engaging
in a sort of precautionary savings, although accumulated in their home country, and
remittances have to be considered and investigated as a type of saving decision.
Indeed, many studies have tested the theoretical hypothesis of the motives for remitting
other than the insurance-saving motive and found little statistical evidence on alterna-
tive drivers. For instance, Stark and Lucas (1988) underline that the motive to remit may
be pure altruism, but finds empirical evidence for the theory of pure self-interest using
data on Botswana. He concludes that altruism alone does not appear to be a sufficient
explanation on the motivation to remit.
Thirdly, other studies show that differences in saving patterns and in the wealth posi-
tion may be caused by differences in earnings, which can be related to differences in
socio-economic characteristics among migrants (cultural background, different skills,
etc). Carroll et al. (1994) find that the saving patterns of immigrants are significantly dif-
ferent across countries of origin. There are two effects that might contribute to the saving
differentials among different groups. The first one is the immigration effect that corre-
sponds to an effect relevant for all groups of immigrants; the second is the cultural effect
and is referred to the immigrant’s origin country characteristics (or to the characteristics
of the ethnic group). Moreover, the saving patterns of immigrants do not match up with
the saving patterns of the origin countries in aggregate data. Indeed, using data from the
US census from 1980-1990, they find that the immigrants from countries with high sav-
ing rates, such as Japan, Korea, Taiwan, do not have higher saving rates than the other
migrants.
Another important question regards the difference in savings behavior between
migrants and natives. Cobb-Clark and Hildebrand (2003) argue that individuals may
retain some social norms about inter-generational transfers; this can influence the
amount of expected inherited wealth and consequently the post-migration savings
propensity. The difference in these social norms between origin and destination countries
may lead to differences in the savings behavior between migrants and natives, as well as
within the heterogeneous immigrant population. Using data from the Survey of Income
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Program Participation, Cobb-Clark andHildebrand (2003) show that foreign-born house-
holds in the US are less wealthy than their US-born counterparts. Their findings indicate
that the diversity in wealth levels can be attributed primarily to differences among the
origin regions rather than to differences among entry cohorts.
The purpose of this study is twofold. First, we provide an empirical analysis of the sav-
ings behavior of the foreign-born by using the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS)
during the period 1991-2008. The main aim is to assess whether migrants are engaged
in a form of saving activity and give evidence on whether the rate of savings is different
between temporary and permanent migrants. The theoretical reference is the model by
Galor and Stark (1990), where under a positive probability of return, the migrants would
save more, and in the case they do not return, the total wealth of the migrants is higher
than for the natives.
Our study performs different estimation methods in order to verify the theoretical pre-
diction of higher savings for the temporary immigrants. We have underlined how the
choice to save is closely linked to the decision to remit. Hence, the binary choice of sav-
ing or not saving is modeled together with the choice of remitting or not remitting in a
bivariate dynamic structure. Moreover, the decision to save or to remit is censored, and
we deem that a Tobit dynamic bivariate model is the most appropriate estimation choice.
Estimation results show that the amount of savings for temporary migrants is higher by
around 26 percent with respect to the permanent migrants.
The second aim of the study is to compare the saving behavior of migrants with that
of natives. We propose an index of financial (in)capability adjusted for income along the
lines of Taylor et al. (2011) and perform a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition in order to
establish what is the origin of the difference between natives and migrants, i.e., which
socio-economic characteristics (besides income and wealth) can explain that difference.2
We find that, although the probability to save does not depend on the temporary nature
of migration, there is a significant increase in the amount of savings in the case where the
migrant is staying temporarily in the country. The amount of savings is 26 percent higher
for temporarymigrants. Another interesting result comes from our nonlinear decomposi-
tionmodel a la Blinder-Oaxaca. The decomposition shows that the saving behavior differs
between migrants and natives because of both socio-economic characteristics (e.g., edu-
cation level, occupational status, age, etc.) and behavioral differences (i.e., propensities to
save), but with a higher weight for socio-economic characteristics when introducing the
index of financial (in)capability – from 45 percent to over 95 percent.
The contribution to the existing literature is twofold. First, this is the first study, to
our knowledge, that attempts to compare the saving rates of temporary and permanent
migrants when including endogenously the remitting behavior with a bivariate dynamic
model. Our results allow for providing empirical evidence on the economic integration of
migrants in UK using savings rather than earnings or employment status, similar to how
Bauer and Sinning (2011) explores the savings of migrants using the GOESP database for
Germany.
Second, we study differences in the savings rates between migrants and natives using
a (Tobit) nonlinear decomposition model as an extension of the original Blinder-Oaxaca
decomposition, following the similarmethodology proposed by Bauer and Sinning (2010).
Section 2 describes the data and the hypothesis on which the empirical analysis is based.
In Section 3, we investigate the saving behavior of temporary versus permanent migrants
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by means of a dynamic bivariate probit model in order to model contemporaneously
savings and remittances. Section 4 presents more evidence on the difference between
temporary and permanent migrants and also offers an analysis of the differences between
natives and migrants in terms of saving choices with the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Data and hypothesis
The British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) began in 1991 and was designed as an annual
survey of the adult population (see Taylor et al. 2002). It is a nationally representative sam-
ple of more than 5,000 households, totaling approximately 10,000 individual interviews.
It is a survey in which all adult members of each household are available to be inter-
viewed each year. The primary purpose of BHPS data is to collect detailed information
on demographics and socio-economic behavior of the UK households, such as house-
hold’s consumption, income, geographic mobility, etc. The total person-year observations
are 180,543, after excluding for non-response and non-valid values of the variables. The
BHPS also comprises foreign-born individuals and households, and this is the sub-sample
that we use for the empirical investigation.
We identify immigrants by their place of birth, limit the analysis to both males and
females older than 16, and use data on occupation, education, and household income.
These restrictions bring the sample size of migrants to an unbalanced panel of 7,709
person-year observations equal to 4.3 percent of the total sample. The sample size of
natives amounts to 171,642 person-year observation.
In the migrants’ sample, households of at least couples are 70 percent; males are 58
percent. In terms of employment status, 56 percent of the sample is employed, and around
11 percent declares to be self-employed, confirming that the share of the self-employed is
relatively high among migrants in developed countries (see for instance Mesnard 2004),
this also being a source of income uncertainty.
In terms of education attainment, a share of 13 percent has finished secondary school,
and only 24 percent of individuals have no qualification. Meanwhile around 25 percent
have finished college or obtained a University degree.
One of the aims of the study is to test whether the saving behavior changes with different
migration plans and to verify if the temporary nature of migration affects the savings
decisions.
In order to test this hypothesis, at first we need to identify temporary and permanent
migrants in the panel. In fact, in the BHPS, the response status – reporting whether the
household was found absent or did not respond to (some of) the following waves and why
that happened – is very informative. The survey records not only asmissing the household
that was not interviewed but also the reason of the non-response. In particular, the value
Outside UK allows us to identify whether the individual is out of the panel (attrition)
and outside the country. When the interviewee is foreign born, then we can identify as
temporary migrants all of those who are recorded as out of the country for some part of
the sample.3 The number of identified temporary migrants is equal to 144.
Another focus of the empirical analysis is to show drivers of the saving behavior among
migrants – whether or not an individual saves from his current income and how much –
and between migrants and natives – whether the level of savings (as a fraction of income)
is associated to the same socio-economic variables and with the same propensities. The
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other relevant feature, still closely connected to the saving behavior, is the amount of
remittances.
Some of the questions in the BHPS allow to obtain a good proxy of savings and
remittances for migrants.
In fact, in each wave, any individual is asked “Do you save any amount of your income
for example by putting something away now and then in a bank, building society, or Post
Office account other than to meet regular bills?”. If the respondent replies positively, then
he or she is asked “About howmuch on average do you manage to save a month?”. The first
question identifies the proportion of the savers in the sample and the second the average
amount of monthly savings.
In the BHPS, each individual is also asked: “Do you send or give money to anyone who
does not live here?”. The answer could be labeled as remittances for the purpose of our
analysis.
A full description of the variables is contained in Table 1.
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for natives and for all the migrants. We ought
to notice that the propensity and the amount of savings of migrants strongly depends on
the general economic conditions. Indeed, migrants are usually hit hard by downturns of
the economy and by adverse shocks in the labor market. Figure 1 depicts the relationship
between the unemployment rate in the UK and the amount of savings of the foreign-
born for the period 1991-2008. The graph shows a strong negative correlation; meanwhile,
Figure 1(a) shows a very similar trend between household income and the amount saved
in the same period.
Some evidence is clear already from these descriptive statistics. For instance, 39
percent of the migrants and 42 percent of natives declare to save from their current
income, but the average amount of savings per month is higher (although not statistically
significant) for migrants, £167.54 versus £157.17 respectively.
Table 3 reports detailed statistics on social and economic characteristics of migrants,
separating temporary from permanent foreign-born residents. In terms of monthly
savings, temporary migrants show a higher average, although not significantly different –
around £60 versus £58 – but permanent migrants save more and hold a higher percentage
of assets. The extensive margin of remitters is higher for permanent migrants, i.e., only
5 percent of temporary migrants declare to send remittances versus 24 percent among
permanent residents. Figure 2(a) shows the general trends of migrants’ savings and remit-
tances for all the years in our panel, whereas Figure 2(b) shows the same trends but
distinguishes between temporary and permanent migrants.
Indeed, in the following Section 3, we take into account the joint decision of saving and
remitting by the migrants.
The comparison between natives and migrants is instead confined to Section 4.
3 Savings and remittances of temporary vs. permanent migrants
Galor and Stark (1990) have analyzed the differences in savings between natives and
migrants by employing an overlapping generation framework. They show that migrants
should save proportionally more than natives if they face a positive probability of
return migration. In fact, this result is consistent with the life-cycle theory of con-
sumption when migrants expect a drop in future income that is higher than for
natives.
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Table 1 Variable description: BHPS 1991-2008
Variables Categories Description
Dependent variables
Saver Binary Declare to save from Current Income: 1=Yes; 0=No
Remitter Binary Declaring to send money to residents abroad 1=Yes, 0=No
Amount Saved Continuous Amount saved each month from Current Income
Remittances Continuous Amount of Remittances send per month
Index of Financial Incapability Continuous Index [-1; 1] 1=Low Capability; -1= High Capability
Socio-Demographic Controls
Individual level
UK-Born Binary Dummy Variable: 1= Born in UK, 0=Otherwise
Age Continuous Working Age for the whole Sample : 18-65 Years
Male Binary Dummy variable: 1=Male; 0=Female
Married Binary Dummy variable:1=Married or living in couple; 0=otherwise
Employed Binary Dummy variable: 1=Yes ; 0=No
Education Level Binary Dummy variables for: ‘No Qualification’, ‘O Level’,
‘No College Degree’ ‘University Degree’
Reference Category: ‘College Degree’
Household level
Household Type Binary Couple=1; Single=0
Number of Children Ordinal Number of children in the Household [0-9]
Net Household Income Continuous Yearly Household Income deflated by 2005 CPI
(divided by 100) and divided by the household size
Household Owner Binary Head of the household is the ower of the house 1=Yes; 0=No
Mortgage Binary The Household has mortgage for the house 1=Yes; 0=No
Derived variables
Temporary Binary Migrant staying temporary in UK
Holding Assets Continuous Declaring on holding financial assets
Financial evaluation
Financial Situation Binary Financial situation: Alright or Difficult
Financial Expectation Binary Financial Expectation for the next year:
Better, Worse or the Same
Financial changed Binary Financial Situation changed with respect to last year:
Earnings Increased, Earning Decreased,
Life is more expensive, Life is less expensive
Regional Dummies Binary Dummy variables for ‘London’, ‘South-East’, ‘South-West’,
‘East of England’, ‘East Midlands’, ‘West Midlands’,
‘Yorkshire’, ‘North-East’, ‘North-West’, ‘Scotland’;
Reference category: ‘Wales’
Yearly Dummies Binary Dummy variables for years 1990-2008
The same reasoning applies when considering different categories of migrants, and the
planned duration of the migration project may affect their saving decisions.
One of the purposes of this study is to test empirically this theoretical claim by mak-
ing use of the long panel of micro data contained in the BHPS for the years 1991-2008. In
particular, we want to show that the propensity of saving is different between temporary
and permanent migrants. Additional evidence is also provided in Section 4. As explained
below, we use a bivariate dynamic model in order to endogenize another important
saving-like choice of migrants, i.e., remittances.
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Table 2 Summary statistics: BHPS 1991-2008
(1) (2)
Natives Migrants
Mean SD Mean SD
Individual
Age 39.07 13.73 39.53 12.40
Male % 0.54 0.50 0.58 0.49
Married % 0.67 0.47 0.70 0.46
Employed % 0.60 0.49 0.56 0.50
Self-employed % 0.07 0.26 0.11 0.31
Unemployed % 0.04 0.20 0.06 0.23
No Qualification % 0.26 0.44 0.24 0.43
O Level % 0.21 0.41 0.13 0.33
No College % 0.40 0.49 0.38 0.49
College of University % 0.13 0.33 0.25 0.43
Household
Household Type (1=couple) % 0.91 0.29 0.91 0.29
Number of Children 0.62 0.98 0.83 1.24
Household Income x 102 29.08 17.83 29.52 18.85
Household Owner 0.73 0.44 0.74 0.44
Mortgage % 0.25 0.44 0.24 0.43
Savings
Declare to save(monthly) % 0.42 0.49 0.39 0.49
Amount of saving (monthly) 155.17 227.97 167.55 235.25
Remitter % 0.07 0.25 0.12 0.33
Amount of Remittances 227.24 527.29 268.80 418.72
Holding Assets % 0.24 1.35 0.24 1.34
Stayed Temporary in UK 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.08
Financial Situation
Financial Difficult % 0.09 0.29 0.14 0.35
Financial Alright % 0.91 0.29 0.86 0.35
Financial Expectations
Financial Better % 0.32 0.47 0.37 0.48
Financial Worse % 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.32
Financial Same % 0.57 0.49 0.52 0.50
Financial Changed
Earnings Increased (from last year) % 0.40 0.49 0.38 0.49
Earnings Decreased (from last year) % 0.18 0.38 0.19 0.39
Life is Less Expenses % 0.07 0.26 0.06 0.24
Life is More Expenses % 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40
N 171642 7709
Yearly Household Income deflated by 2005 CPI.
3.1 A bivariate dynamic probit model for saving and remittances
Evaluating the saving behavior of migrants without accounting for the endogenous effect
of remittances is misleading.
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Figure 1 Savings, income and unemployment for migrants (1991-2008). (a) Savings and unemployment.
(b) Saving and household income.
Differently from natives, migrants may save (e.g., put somemoney in their bank account
for precautionary reasons), but at the same time, they send their savings home as remit-
tances. The endogeneity of remittances would cause biased and inconsistent estimates of
the parameters (and of their standard errors) when assessing the propensity to save.
To address the issue of interrelated dynamics of savings and remittances, we use a
bivariate dynamic probit model with random effects where the two dependent variables
represent the dichotomic choice of saving or not and of sending money home or not. This
model also allows for correlated unobserved heterogeneity and accounts for the initial
conditions of the two processes. We follow Alessie et al. (2004) and a recent application
proposed by Devicienti and Poggi (2011).
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Table 3 Summary statistics: temporary and permanent migrants
(1) (2)
Temporary Permanent
Mean SD Mean SD
Age 31.14 12.26 39.57 12.38
Male % 0.45 0.50 0.58 0.49
Married % 0.34 0.48 0.70 0.46
Employed % 0.52 0.51 0.56 0.50
No Qualification 0.27 0.45 0.24 0.43
O level 0.18 0.39 0.13 0.33
No College 0.23 0.42 0.38 0.49
University Degree 0.32 0.47 0.25 0.43
Declare to save (monthly) % 0.39 0.49 0.39 0.49
Amount of saving (monthly) 59.89 168.88 58.43 160.20
Remitter % 0.05 0.21 0.12 0.33
Amount of Remittances 250.00 430.80 268.90 419.84
Holding Assets % 0.07 0.24 0.24 1.35
Duration of Migration 20.26 10.66 24.72 13.11
N 144 7665
Source: British Household Panel Survey (1991-2008).
All monetary variables are deflated by 2005 CPI.
For the individual i declaring to save from his current income and sendingmoney home,
the following equations are used to specify the choices at each time t:
ys,i,t = βsxi,t + λs,sys,i,t−1 + λs,ryr,i,t−1 + αs,i + us,i,t (1)
yr,i,t = βrxit + λr,sys,i,t−1 + λr,ryr,i,t−1 + αr,i + ur,i,t (2)
yj,i,t =
{
1 if zi,t > 0
0 if else
}
for z = s, r; t = 1, 2, . . .T (3)
The dependent variables are the two dummy indicators: ys,i,t is equal to one if the indi-
vidual i declares to save from his current income at time t (i.e., positive level of declared
savings by individual i, si,t > 0), zero otherwise; and yr,i,t is equal to one if i is sending
money home at time t (i.e., positive level of declared remittances by individual i, ri,t > 0),
zero otherwise. In the model represented by Equations (1)–(3), xi,t is a vector of control
variables (not necessarily dichotomic), assumed to be strictly exogenous, and βs and βr
are the two vectors of parameters of interest to be estimated.4
The error terms us,i,t and ur,i,t are assumed to be independent over time and to fol-
low a bivariate normal distribution, with zero means, unit variances and cross-equation
covariance ρu. The model also includes individual random effects, αs,i and αr,i, following
a bivariate normal with variances σα,s and σα,r and covariance ρα . We assume that (αs,i,
αr,i,), (us,i,t , ur,i,t) and xit are orthogonal.5
The main advantages of multivariate dynamic random-effects models are their ability
to distinguish between unobserved heterogeneity (random effects) and state dependence
(the lagged dependent variable). It allows contemporaneous savings to be partly explained
by the remittances at t−1 (the lagged state dependent variable) but also enables controlling
for the contemporaneous spillover effects between the two states because ρα = 0.
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Figure 2 Savings and remittances trends (1991-2008). (a) Savings and remittances migrants. (b) Permanent
and temporary migrants.
The parameters in the vectors β ’s represent the marginal effects of the various indepen-
dent variables. The main coefficients of interest are related to the marginal effects of the
following independent variables: the nature of the migration (dummy variable=1 if the
migrant is temporary) and ethnicity (dummy variable=1 if individual i is born in UK). Sev-
eral other factors that may influence the saving behavior and the other control variables
are: gender (male), marital status (married), household type (single), mean household
income (net household income/household members), owners of real estate (household
owner), and amount of financial assets; we also include some linear and nonlinear effects
(age and age squared). We include three dummy variables to distinguish the occupational
Arcangelis and Joxhe IZA Journal of Migration  (2015) 4:11 Page 12 of 23
status of the individuals (employed, self-employed, unemployed), four dummy variables
for the level of education (O level, no college, college and university degree). Yearly and
regional dummies are included in order to account for the unobserved heterogeneity due
to time and space.
3.2 The initial conditions problem and the estimations results
The first results of the pooled bivariate model are shown in Table 4.
The results of the pooled bivariate model show a very high significant state depen-
dence between the two stati, saving and remitting. It is easy to underline that being
a saver at (t − 1) increases the probability of engaging in a saving activity at time
t at 1 percent significance, but the status of remitter at (t − 1) decreases this
probability.
The results shown in Table 4 are biased and inconsistent estimates when the unobserved
heterogeneity is correlated with the lagged dependent variables.
In particular, the coefficients produced by the pooled estimation of our bivariate
model are biased upward and overestimate the effects of the independent variables on
both probabilities of saving and remitting. The overestimation of the parameters is due
Table 4 Bivariate dynamic model for savers and remitters
Saver Remitter
Pool bivariate Wooldridge Pool bivariate Wooldridge
correction correction
Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE
Saver (t-1) 1.24*** (0.01) 1.16*** (0.01) -0.06*** (0.02) -0.05*** (0.02)
Remitter(t-1) -0.05** (0.02) -0.05** (0.02) 1.85*** (0.02) 1.74*** (0.03)
Saver (t0) 0.28*** (0.01) -0.01 (0.02)
Remitter (t0) -0.02 (0.02) 0.40*** (0.03)
Age -0.01 (0.01) -0.01** (0.01) 0.08*** (0.01) 0.05*** (0.01)
Age2 0.01 (0.01) 0.01* (0.01) -0.01*** (0.01) -0.01*** (0.01)
Married 0.03* (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02)
Self-employed 0.28*** (0.02) 0.28*** (0.02) 0.30*** (0.03) 0.30*** (0.03)
Employed 0.43*** (0.01) 0.42*** (0.01) 0.20*** (0.02) 0.20*** (0.02)
O level 0.09*** (0.02) 0.06*** (0.02) 0.11*** (0.03) 0.10*** (0.03)
No College 0.13*** (0.02) 0.08*** (0.02) 0.17*** (0.03) 0.16*** (0.03)
University degree 0.23*** (0.02) 0.16*** (0.02) 0.28*** (0.03) 0.28*** (0.03)
Net Household Income 0.01*** (0.01) -0.01*** (0.01) 0.01*** (0.01) 0.01*** (0.01)
Household Owner 0.18*** (0.01) 0.04* (0.02) -0.12*** (0.02) -0.12*** (0.04)
Household Type 0.08*** (0.02) 0.03 (0.02) -0.10*** (0.03) -0.09*** (0.03)
Number of Childrens -0.09*** (0.01) -0.04*** (0.01) -0.12*** (0.01) -0.33*** (0.02)
Asset Holders 0.04*** (0.01) 0.02*** (0.01) 0.01*** (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Temporary Migrant -0.40 (0.49) -0.30 (0.53) -0.66 (0.66) -0.46 (0.61)
Uk-born 0.05* (0.03) 0.03 (0.03) -0.22*** (0.03) -0.19*** (0.04)
Constant -1.63*** (0.07) -1.57*** (0.07) -3.67*** (0.12) -3.53*** (0.12)
Average Variables (x) No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 95680 95628 95680 95628
Source: BHPS 1991-2008.
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to the problem of the initial conditions, as suggested by Heckman (1981), where the
dependent variables (in our case, declaring to save and remit) can be influenced by the
other variables, by unobserved individual heterogeneity, and by the presence of correlated
lagged endogenous variables.
The initial conditions problem suggested by Heckman (1981) raises an important issue
for the estimation of dynamic discrete choice models with dynamics where the unob-
served heterogeneity term is correlated with (past values of ) the dependent variable. In
a static discrete choice model, the problem does not appear, and the strict exogeneity of
all the control variables suffices to have consistent and unbiased estimates. In a dynamic
setting, the exogeneity of the control variables is difficult to hold and impossible when
one of the regressors is a lagged dependent variable.
The Heckman (1981) approach suggests enriching the likelihood function with the
reduced form equation for the initial observation and then maximize using the full set of
sample observations, allowing for cross-correlation.6
The problem of initial conditions occurs when the econometrician deals especially with
short panel datasets. For instance, Yu et al. (2008) suggest that the initial conditions prob-
lem does not cause any serious bias if the panel consists of 20 waves and over, but the bias
is considered significant with panels with 8 waves or less.
In the case of our bivariate model, the presence of the both lagged dependent vari-
ables and the correlation with the unobserved individual heterogeneity implies that the
Heckman correction is required. Alessie et al. (2004) extends the model proposed by
Heckman (1981), initially for a univariate discrete choice model to a bivariate framework,
introducing two static equations for t = 1, which can be seen as a linearized approxima-
tion of the reduced form for the latent variable. The Alessie et al. (2004) estimator requires
Simulated Maximum Likelihood Estimation.
An alternative framework to account for the initial conditions problem is Wooldridge
(2005) who proposes a Conditional Maximum Likelihood (CML) estimator, assuming the
distribution conditional to the initial values and to the trace of the observed exogenous
variables. Specifically, instead of assuming (yi,1 . . . yi,T ) modeled on the xi (not neces-
sarily dichotomic), he assumes the distribution of the density (yi,1 . . . yi,T ) conditional to
(yi,T , xi). Wooldridge restricts the model to the univariate case and specifies the following
equation to be estimated:
αi = a0 + a1yi,1 + a2xi + i, (4)
where a0, a1, a2 are the parameters to be estimated, xi are the averaged-over-time values
of the control variables, and i is distributed as an i.i.d..
Devicienti and Poggi (2011) extend the model proposed by Wooldridge (2005) for the
bivariate case using the following specification when using our symbols:
αs,i = as,0 + as,sys,i,1 + as,ryr,i,1 + as,xxi + s,i,1 (5)
αr,i = ar,0 + ar,sys,i,1 + ar,ryr,i,1 + ar,xxi + r,i,1 (6)
According to our dataset, ys,i,1 and yr,i,1 are the two initial values of the two dependent
variables, i.e., status of saver and status of remitter. By including Equations (5) and (6)
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in the framework of our bivariate model (1)–(3), we get the following equations for the
estimation of the model:
ys,i,t = βsx′i,t + λs,s1ys,i,t−1 + λs,ryr,i,t−1 + as,0 + as,sys,i,1 + as,ryr,i,1 + as,xxi + s,i + us,i,t
(7)
yr,i,t = βrx′it + λr,sys,i,t−1 + λr,ryr,i,t−1 + ar,0 + ar,sys,i,1 + ar,syr,i,1 + ar,xxi + r,i + ur,i,t
(8)
Equations (7) and (8) can be estimated with CMSL and will produce consistent
estimates.7
The estimation of the model proposed by Alessie et al. (2004) requires approaches
of numerical integration through simulation of the data through a BFGS algorithm.8
We apply the extension proposed by Devicienti and Poggi (2011) using the Wooldridge
(2005) method for bivariate estimation because of more efficiency due to our large
sample.9
The results of our estimation are shown in Table 4 under the columns Wooldridge
Correction, whereas the marginal effects are reported in Table 5.
When computing the marginal effects after running the Wooldridge correction, almost
all the control variables report highly and significant coefficients (at a 1 percent level
of significance) with the expected sign. Employed, self-employed, and individuals with
higher levels of education save and remit more with respect to the other categories
(unemployed and lower levels of education).
The marginal effects have positive signs for all the occupational categories (the ref-
erence category is being unemployed) and level of education (the reference category is
college degree). Regarding the self-employed individuals, we detect a relatively high effect
with increasing probabilities for both saving and remitting, but it is more intense for the
remitter status. Higher educational levels are associated with more savings and remit-
tances at the same time. The probability of saving also increases with net household
income and decreases with being a household owner or living with a partner, which are all
proxies of integration and longer plans of staying. Significant and positive effects are also
shown for demographic characteristics – for instance, the older the people, the higher
their amount of savings but not of remittances; meanwhile, married individuals prefer
more remittances than savings. Having more children decreases both probabilities. The
coefficient that identifies non UK-born shows negative marginal effects for saving and
positive effects for remittances. Thus, all migrants (temporary and permanent) will place
relatively more remittances then savings.
The main coefficient of interest is the nature of migration (temporary or perma-
nent), and no significant effect was found with the starting bivariate model. How-
ever, when the marginal effects are computed and reported in Table 5, the average
marginal effects of both status (saving and remitting) are significant at the 1 per-
cent level and negative. The marginal effect of being temporary is significant and
negative with respect to being a saver. More precisely, when the decision on migra-
tion duration is temporary, the probability of saving decreases by 3 percent. It means
that the migrant places a larger amount of remittances than savings in the hosting
country.
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Table 5Marginal effects of the bivariate dynamic model for savers and remitters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
p11 p10 p01 p00 Remitter Saver
Save (t-1) (d) 0.015*** 0.445*** -0.020*** -0.440*** 0.460*** -0.005***
(0.0007) (0.0039) (0.0008) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0013)
Remit (t-1) (d) 0.182*** -0.200*** 0.270*** -0.252*** -0.018** 0.451***
(0.0053) (0.0055) (0.0064) (0.0071) (0.0075) (0.0089)
Age 0.003*** -0.004*** 0.004*** -0.003*** -0.001 0.006***
(0.0001) (0.0011) (0.0002) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0004)
Agesq -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001** 0.001 -0.001***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Married (d) 0.004 0.011* -0.004 -0.015* 0.011* 0.001
(0.0008) (0.0057) (0.0011) (0.0058) (0.0059) (0.0019)
Self-employed (d) 0.021*** 0.091*** 0.011*** -0.121*** 0.111*** 0.031***
(0.0022) (0.0083) (0.0019) (0.0083) (0.0086) (0.0039)
Employ (d) 0.013*** 0.151*** 0.003*** -0.166*** 0.163*** 0.016***
(0.0007) (0.0047) (0.0010) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0016)
O level (d) 0.006*** 0.028*** 0.004*** -0.037*** 0.033*** 0.009***
(0.0013) (0.0067) (0.0015) (0.0068) (0.0069) (0.0027)
No college degree (d) 0.008*** 0.041*** 0.006*** -0.055*** 0.049*** 0.014***
(0.0010) (0.0057) (0.0012) (0.0058) (0.0059) (0.0021)
University degree (d) 0.016*** 0.073*** 0.010*** -0.100*** 0.090*** 0.026***
(0.0018) (0.0075) (0.0018) (0.0076) (0.0078) (0.0035)
Net Household Income 0.001*** 0.004*** 0.001*** -0.005*** 0.005*** 0.001***
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Household Owner (d) -0.002** 0.070*** -0.009*** -0.059*** 0.068*** -0.010***
(0.0007) (0.0048) (0.0011) (0.0049) (0.0050) (0.0019)
Household Type (d) -0.002* 0.033*** -0.006*** -0.025*** 0.031*** -0.008***
(0.0012) (0.0083) (0.0018) (0.0084) (0.0086) (0.0030)
Number of Children -0.005*** -0.027*** -0.004*** 0.037*** -0.033*** -0.0101***
(0.0004) (0.002) (0.0005) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0009)
Asset Holders 0.001*** 0.013*** 0.001 -0.014*** 0.014*** 0.001***
(0.0001) (0.0021) (0.0002) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.00032)
Temporary Migrant (d) -0.014*** -0.132 -0.016 0.162 -0.146 -0.030**
(0.0037) (0.161) (0.0100) (0.1570) (0.1610) (0.0135)
Uk-born (d) -0.008*** 0.028*** -0.013*** -0.005 0.019* -0.022***
(0.0018) (0.0106) (0.0024) (0.0109) (0.0112) (0.0040)
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses.
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
4 Savings of temporary and permanent migrants vs natives and their
financial capability
As mentioned above, the life-cycle theory predicts that migrants should save more than
natives if their expectation of future income is lower. However, the saving choice depends
on many different dimensions other than current income, and in this section, we inves-
tigate the importance of various socio-economic variables in determining the difference
between natives’ and migrants’ saving behavior. In particular, we build an index of finan-
cial capability adjusted for income in order to highlight the importance of all the factors,
besides income, that can play a role in the saving choices of natives and migrants.
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4.1 The index of financial capability
Although the capability of saving is mainly constrained by economic indicators like
income and wealth, many other socio-economic variables play an important role in the
saving choice. Some of these variables are easily observable – like the education level –
but many others are more difficult to measure and to quantify, although important in the
saving decision – for instance, the degree of trust in the financial system, the psycholog-
ical attitude towards savings, etc. Cultural and psychological factors are quite important
when assessing the capability of saving and of managing financial assets (see, for instance,
Atkinson et al. 2006).
The concept of financial (in)capability involves general economic knowledge and par-
ticular skills that may induce saving or investment in financial assets, but is determined
also by general psychological attributes, although unobservable.
Recent studies have analyzed the concept of financial capability relating it to psycho-
logical well-being (as in Taylor et al. 2011) or to consumer behavior (as in Atkinson et al.
2006).
The research conducted by Taylor et al. (2011) introduces the concept of financial capa-
bility with an index as the sum of the scores of four groups of variables and involving
multivariate analysis. Using data from BHPS, they found that financial and psycholog-
ical well-being are highly correlated with the financial capability index. They find that
greater financial incapability is instead associated with greater mental stress, lower life
satisfaction, and reported health problems (like anxiety or depression).
The consumermarket research proposed by Atkinson et al. (2006) underlines the results
of a baseline survey in UK assessing the concept of financial well-being and financial
capability. They propose a factor analysis across the four domains from which they create
five separate scores for each respondent. The first two scores relate to different aspects of
the first domain – managing money – meanwhile, the other three scores relate to three
separate domains – planning ahead, choosing products, and staying informed. They obtain
scores within each area and conclude that older people, people with higher incomes, and
those in couples with no dependent children have the greatest financial capability, while
younger people, people in couples with dependent children, single people, and those with
lower income have lower capability.
Using factor analysis, we propose an index of financial incapability for the two groups
of our interest – natives and migrants – by following the method proposed by Taylor
et al. (2011).
We use three domains of different variables that capture the multidimensional environ-
ment of the index and calculate a score index for each individual among migrants and
natives. The three domains of variables are a) Perceived Financial Situation, b) Finan-
cial Expectations, and c) Financial Situation changed. Each of the three domains use the
answers to the different questions of the BHPS (see the last three parts in Table 2 where
we reported the summary statistics).
A Spearman rank correlation test is also performed for all 9 variables.10 Indeed, the
index is computed by the multivariate approach of factor analysis and using the correla-
tions between variables in order to determine the underlying factor representing financial
capability (see Taylor et al. 2011).
We regress the factors produced by the multivariate approach on net household income
(household income divided by the number of members in the household) in order to
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obtain an indicator adjusted by income. As the result of this orthogonalization, the index
captures the heterogeneity due to financial capability aside from household income.
This index is shown in Figure 3 and is normalized to take values in the interval [-1,1]
(with the mean 0.0001 and standard deviation equal to 0.14). Figure 3(a) shows the kernel
density of the index for the two subgroups of the population, whereas in Figure 3(b), we
show the correlation of the constructed index with the amount of savings for the two
subgroups of the populations. As is evident in the graphs, there is stochastic dominance
of the natives for all the distributions. Figure 3(a) shows that natives have relatively higher
density around the zero mean. Figure 3(b) reports that the amount of savings decreases
Figure 3 Index of financial incapability and savings. (a) Density distribution: index of financial incapability.
(b) Correlation between savings and index financial incapability.
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when financial incapability increases (with some nonlinear effects for negative values of
the index), but it is always higher for natives.
4.2 Temporary and permanent migrants: estimation of the saving equation
Our study aims at analyzing the saving behavior of migrants (temporary and permanent)
and natives by taking into account observed variables and good proxies of unobserved
variables. The idea is to uncover the characteristics or social-economic variables that
would explain the different saving profiles between natives and migrants.
When using data from the German Panel (GOESP), Bauer and Sinning (2011) found
that permanent migrants in Germany save relatively less than the natives, and this is due
mainly to the differences in current and permanent income, suggesting that permanent
migrants might not have the capacity to save as much as native households because of
solely economic reasons.
The summary statistics shown in Table 2 report a very high percentage of individuals
declaring “not saving monthly”. This percentage is slightly different for the two groups: 61
percent of migrants and 58 percent of natives report no monthly savings.
When using highly censored data, OLS estimation provides inconsistent estimates of
parameters, and a standard censored Tobit model would fit better with our data. Two
separate equations for the two groups (natives n and migrants m) are estimated so as to
allow for a further decomposition analysis.11 The equations can be written as an index
function in the following way:
S∗i,t,j = Xi,t,jβj + i,t,j, where
Si,t,j = 0 if S∗i,t,j ≤ 0
Si,t,j = S∗i,t,j if Si,t,j∗ > 0 for i = 1....N and t = 1....T and j = m, n
The unconditional expected value of savings Si,t,j for individual i at time t and belonging
to group j equals the probability of Si,t,j being uncensored and the expectation of Si,t,j
given positive savings (the conditional expectation).















where φ(·) represents the normal density function and (·) is the normal distribution
function; the two parameters to estimate by the Maximum Likelihood are the coefficients
in βj and the standard deviations in ξj for each group j = m, n.
The results of the Tobit model with and without the index are shown in Table 6 when
considering only the subsample of all migrants, but distinguishing between temporary
and permanent migrants.13 The dependent variable is the amount of monthly savings,
and this also includes remittances in the case of migrants.
We ought to notice the negative effects of the financial incapability index on the amount
of savings: the coefficient is negative and significant at the 1 percent significance level. All
the other control variables have the expected sign; for instance, the high education level,
as a University degree, has a positive sign, and it is significant at the 1 percent level. Three
dummy variables for education and household characteristics are also included along with
regional and yearly dummies.
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Assets Holding x102 0004*** 0001***
(0040) (0001)











Estimation only for Non-UK Born;
Regional and Year dummies are included but not reported.
Standard errors are in parentheses *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
Differently from the evidence in Section 3, the difference between permanent and tem-
porary migrants is now positive at common significance levels as expected by theoretical
prediction. The dummy for temporary migrants is significant at the 10 percent level for
the Tobit estimation, and shows that the amount of savings will increase by 26 percent.
4.3 Migrants vs. natives: non-linear decomposition model
A second type of analysis regards a comparison between migrants and natives by dis-
entangling the difference between the two groups as a difference due to structural
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parameters (i.e., a different propensity to save) and due to explanatory variables (i.e., dif-
ferent income levels or financial capability). We make use of the decomposition model
proposed by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973).
Originally, Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) analyzed the wage gap between males
and females. By following a linear decomposition method, their method allows for the
decomposition of the difference in an outcome variable between two groups into one
portion explained by differences in the observed characteristics and a second part due to
differences in the estimated coefficients.
In our case, we cannot use a linear decomposition model due to the large number of
individuals who do not save at all and need to extend the method to the Tobit model






= [Eξn,βn (Si,t,n|Xi,t,n)− Eξn,βm (Si,t,m|Xi,t,m)]
+ [Eξn,βm (Si,t,m|Xi,t,m)− Eξm,βm (Si,t,m|Xi,t,m)]
(10)
The estimation of equation (10) will make use of the Maximum Likelihood function
shown for (9).
Similar to the decomposition equation of the linear model, the calculation of the
counterfactual parts of (10), is based on the average characteristics and the estimated
coefficients and error variance of the two groups, natives and migrants. The idea is to
decompose the difference in the estimated conditional savings of the two groups into a
component that represents the change in the expected savings rate of the households with
positive savings, weighed by the probability of having a positive savings rate, and into a
component that represents the change in the probability of positive savings, weighed by
the expected value of savings if savings are positive (see Bauer and Sinning 2011).
The estimated regressions for migrants and natives (not shown) are decomposed as
proposed by equation (10), and the results are reported in Table 7.
The first part of the Table shows the results of the decomposition of the censored depen-
dent variable through Tobit without including the index of financial (in)capability. This
indicates that nearly 45 percent of the saving differential between migrant and natives is
attributable to differences in observable characteristics, whereas the 50 percent is due to
unobservable variables.
The results of the Tobit decomposition, when including the index, show that almost
95 percent of the differences is due to observable and only 5 percent of the differences
between natives and migrants is not explained. This means that all the characteristics
represented by the control variables used in the regressions shown in Table 6 can actu-
ally explain the differences in the saving patterns between natives and migrants, but the
increase in the goodness of fit is produced mostly by our index.
When considering the remittances as savings, the results remain robust to the first
decomposition when considering only savings as independent variable. The increase in
the goodness of fit in this case is higher, as in this case, remittances may be attributed
only to migrants and not for natives. The percentage that explains the differences in the
characteristics in this case is around 99 percent and only 1 percent can be attributed to
the estimated coefficients.
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Table 7 Decompositionmode for Tobit: natives vs migrants
Savings Natives vs. Migrants-without index Natives vs. Migrants -with index
̂Tobit 0.29 -2.029**
(0.404) (1.027)
Explained part 0.014 -2.038**
(0.040) (1.030)
in % of ̂Tobit [49.94] [95.46]
Unexplained part 0.015 0.092
(0.0096) (0.087)
in % of ̂Tobit [50.06] [4.54]
Savings+Remittances Natives vs. Migrants-without index Natives vs. Migrants -with index
̂Tobit 0.066 -4.70***
(1.28) ( 2.35)
Explained part 0.033 -4.72***
(1.29) (2.36)
in % of ̂Tobit [38.91] [99.01]
Unexplained part 0.033 0.015
(0.023) (0.018)
in % of ̂Tobit [61.09] [0.9]
***Comparison between the decomposition without Index of Financial Incapability and then Including the Index of
Financial Incapability Logarithm of savings; in both cases decomposed Bootstrap (50) replications; standard errors in
parenthesis. Number of observations: Group (A)= 42213; Group (B)=1562.
5 Conclusions
This paper explored the saving behavior across immigrants using a long panel of micro
data, the British Household Panel Survey (1991-2008). The hypothesis underlying the
empirical investigation derives from theoretical predictions where migrants are supposed
to save more in case their migration plans are temporary. The estimation results show
that in the case of temporary migrants, the propensity to save will increase by 26 per-
cent in comparison with those who stay permanently in UK. These results are shown to
be robust using a bivariate probability model in a dynamic setting where the savings and
remittances are considered as binary choices.
As mentioned in the Introduction, many countries show the tendency to prefer tem-
porary versus permanent migrants for the expected negative consequences on natives in
the domestic labor markets. Our evidence shows another consequence of this preference
in migration policy. Temporary migrants tend to save more and therefore contribute less
to the aggregate demand of domestic goods, which may be less desirable when recessions
are characterized by low aggregate demand (as in Europe after the financial crisis).
Moreover, temporary migrants tend not only to save more, but also to remit more.
Hence, this favors a leakage of domestically produced savings towards the origin country.
Many temporary migrants actually end up staying longer than expected, and the ex-post
difference between temporary and permanent migrants is more blurred than expected.
But if temporary migrants acted as if they were to return home (i.e., saving and remitting
more) but instead overstay, the miscalculation of their life-cycle wealth may become an
additional burden for the destination countries.
The second piece of evidence regards the differences in the saving patterns between
migrants and natives by using the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition for a Tobit model of sav-
ing decisions. In particular, we have introduced an index of financial capability adjusted
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for income, and the decomposition analysis shows that the difference in the savings
profiles between natives and migrants may be greatly explained by observable social-
economic characteristics only when projecting in the space spanned also by the index of
financial (in)capability. In other words, our results show that migrants’ socio-economic
characteristics have a different weight in explaining the dissimilar saving behavior with
respect to natives, but the the financial condition plays a determinant role that overcomes
many possible cultural differences between natives and migrants.
Therefore, a relevant message for migration policy interventions is to take into great
consideration the economic and financial conditions of migrants’ households when the
objective is integration and assimilation.
Endnotes
1See, for instance, Avato et al. (2010).
2See Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) for the cited decomposition.
3The discrete variable RFINLOC reports whether the sample member remained at the
same address as the year before and assigns different codes depending on the different,
alternative detected status. For further details, see the BHPS Documentation, ISER,
University of Essex.
4 Alessie et al. (2004) also discusses the special case when λs,r = 0 and λr,s = 0 and the
two Equations (1) and (2) become two separate univariate dynamic probit models whose
only link is the error correlation.
5The last assumption implies that xit are strictly exogenous. The uncorrelation of
individual effects with the other variables is a strong assumption, but we rely on Alessie
et al. (2004), who compares the results of a similar model with a Linear Probability
Model for both variables.
6Let us recall that the period-zero equation cannot include the lagged dependent
variables since they are non-existent. The coefficients obtained are different from the
coefficients in the next-period’s dynamic equations, whereas the random effects are
linear combinations of the random effects. In this way, the error terms are likely to have
a particular covariance structure. See Heckman (1981).
7The simulation is performed in STATA using the Devicienti and Poggi (2011) model
for the estimation of the parameters. The initial values are drawn using 2RN Halton
draws as suggested by Train (2003).
8See Alessie et al. (2004).
9The main reason of this choice is the size of the sample to be simulated. The Alessie
et al. (2004) model fits better only for the panel with less than 40,000 observations,
whereas the Wooldridge (2005) estimator performs better for larger sample sizes. We
recall that the sample size of our panel is 180,543 year-person observations.
10Available upon request by the authors.
11We then also consider remittances as savings, summing the amount of remittances
with saving.
12See also Bauer and Sinning (2010).
13The estimation for natives is used for the decomposition model. It is not reported in
the text, but is available upon request.
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